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POLLS, THE PUBLIC, AND POPULAR
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Peter J. Woolley* & Bruce G. Peabody**
INTRODUCTION
It is hardly commonplace to ask the public about the cases before the
Supreme Court of the United States, and it can be seen as downright
idiosyncratic to poll the public about their views on emerging constitutional
issues. Nevertheless, this is the core initiative we present in this Essay for
Fordham Law Review’s Res Gestae. We are confident our approach is
valuable, innovative, and likely to prompt numerous insights about the
Supreme Court and the nature of constitutional law. We make this case in
greater detail in the companion piece accompanying this discussion. Here,
however, we assume a different tack, outlining the what and the how of our
inquiry into popular perspectives on constitutional issues. Thus, this Essay
examines questions related to our selection of cases, our process and
methods, as well as anticipating questions about, and objections to, those
techniques. Part I of this Essay discusses how we selected the cases. In
Part II, this Essay outlines how we conducted the polling. Part III reviews
the problems we encountered as well as the results of the polls. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of our findings and our future initiatives.
I. SELECTING THE CASES
In pursuing the idea of testing voters’ opinions of cases pending before
the Supreme Court of the United States, we set just two criteria. The first
was that the cases, or at least their underlying issues, should be of general
interest to voters. The nature of polling requires pollsters to ask their
citizen-colleagues to volunteer their time responding to questions about
public affairs. If the respondents are inattentive or uninterested, the risk is
either that they will break off the interview or give unreliable answers—that
is, make random responses that cannot be replicated in repeated efforts.
The second criterion was that the cases should be amenable to polling. In
other words, the heart of the constitutional dispute examined should be
quickly graspable by an untutored layperson. While our polling sample
included a wide range of people, with diverse educational and professional
backgrounds, a sample that, roughly speaking, mirrors the diversity of the
nation’s voters as a whole, we had to assume our respondents had little or
* Peter J. Woolley is Executive Director, PublicMind and Professor of Comparative Politics,
Fairleigh Dickinson University.
** Bruce G. Peabody is Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University.
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no background in constitutional law. Given our reliance on live telephone
interviewing, questions needed to be direct and relatively short. Currently,
telephone interviewing is still considered to be the best way to approach
drawing a random, and therefore representative sample, but an inherent
limitation is that listeners cannot study the question as they might a written
questionnaire. Therefore, complex questions are difficult to follow,
especially if respondents are not already acquainted with the topic.
Thus, while we examined dozens of cases on the Court’s 2010 term
docket, we ultimately focused on four that met our criteria. The first case,
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,1 pitted the state of California
against an interest group arguing that it was legally injured by new
restrictions on sales of violent video games to customers under the age of
eighteen. In Brown v. Plata,2 California and eighteen other states opposed
judicial rulings that would have the state relieve the overburdened prison
system by releasing a significant number of prisoners.
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn3 involved
objections to using state tax credits, in place of vouchers, to compensate
individuals who indirectly contributed to scholarships for children attending
private, religiously affiliated schools. Finally, Camreta v. Greene4 raised
the question of whether, absent a warrant, a minor’s parents needed to grant
permission for an interview when child abuse at home is suspected.
II. CONDUCTING THE POLLS
We selected four cases due to interview time limitations. In this and
other surveys conducted by PublicMind, the polling organization associated
with our university, we generally try to limit ourselves to less than ten
minutes an interview, not to reduce costs, but to ensure a complete
interview. Going too long carries the risk of the respondent running out of
patience, or encountering a distraction, such as children, pets that require
attention, household chores, or TV programs. This concern is particularly
important because the last several questions of a standard interview provide
crucial demographic information, and allow pollsters the opportunity to
both examine the representativeness of the sample and draw conclusions
about differences among subgroups.5
We should also note that these four Supreme Court cases we selected
were not the only topics of the interview. After voters were screened, they
were given a line of questions about President Barack Obama, the direction

1. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
2. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
3. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
5. An example of these demographic differences include those correlated with
ethnicity, income, education, and related factors.
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of the country, and questions about potential or actual presidential
candidates.6
Telephone interviewing7 begins with a database of randomly selected
telephone numbers acquired from a specialized vendor who has attempted
to remove business lines, facsimile machines, and disconnected numbers.8
The numbers are then re-randomly selected and called. All of this is an
attempt to maximize the number of potential, eligible participants in the
survey, in this case, registered voters nationwide, and to ensure that each of
these individuals has a statistically identifiable and equal chance of being
called. Cell phones are included, which is important given the large and
growing number of households that do not have landlines.9
For our constitutional issues poll, we used a national sample of 800
registered voters. If we assume they were indeed selected randomly, the
measurable margin of error is +/- 3.5 percentage points at the 95 percent
level of confidence, meaning that in replicating the poll, 19 out of 20 times
the results will be within 3.5 points of each other. But a statistically valid
statement like this tends to overstate the precision of polling, which, even
when done correctly, is only a scientific method of arriving at an estimate.
Telephone interviews also suffer from refusals, break-offs, language
barriers, equipment problems, and a long list of non-sampling errors, such
as variations in approach and effectiveness from the live interviewers and
even question wording. Many of these problems cannot be measured or
easily redressed.
For our poll, it was an important methodological decision to focus on the
opinions of only registered voters. This is due to the fact that demographics
of registered voters differ in some significant ways from the demographics
of all adults who are permanent residents in the United States. There are
certainly a number of important organizations that base their polling, even
6. For these preceding questions and results, see Press Release, PublicMind, Jersey
Guy Runs Better Nationally than Other Big Republicans (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/ 2011/1103prez.
7. All interviews were conducted by OpinionAmerica Group of Cedar Knolls, New
Jersey, with professionally trained interviewers using a Computer Assisted Telephone
Interviewing (CATI) system.
8. One might ask why we prefer to collect our data by telephone interviews and not
online questionnaires. Online interviewing can be less than half the cost of telephone
interviewing and thus has become an attractive and now widely used vehicle in market
research. However, online interviewing has a range of unattractive limitations, including
missing responses, respondents clicking haphazardly, unreliable demographic data, the
exclusion of people who do not use the internet, the influence of incentives offered for
participation, and the problem of response bias rooted in the idea that people who opt-in to
such questionnaires differ in their views from those who routinely refuse or avoid
participation, or are never recruited in the first place. Many of these problems may be
ameliorated in the future, but for now opt-in questionnaires would make more sense if one
were investigating a population that might be difficult and even prohibitively expensive to
reach by telephone, such as current law students in New York State. For our purposes of
representing the national electorate as accurately as possible, polling results from telephone
interviews were preferable.
9. Cell phone interviewing presents other methodological problems, such as overrepresenting households with multiple cell phones as well as those with both cell phones and
landlines.
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on political or legal affairs, on the latter group. But sampling voters, a
subgroup of the entire adult population, is less difficult than sampling the
entire adult population, and therefore less challenging methodologically.
Secondly, we believe voters are a much more salient and influential
population than non-voters for the purposes of studying public opinion and
its relationship to both the Supreme Court and, more generally, the shaping
of constitutional law.
III. PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
As suggested above, the manner in which polling questions are worded
can make a significant difference in their results. Our aim in asking the
public about pending constitutional cases was to be direct, simple, and fair.
We strove to eliminate legal terminology, assuming that it was possible to
get at the core dilemmas or choices at issue in our cases without resorting to
terms of art, references to pertinent precedent or even specific constitutional
language.
In presenting our answer categories, we strived to make the best case for
each side. We tested the questions with academicians as well as nonspecialists to achieve a balance of clarity and simplicity while maintaining
fidelity to the legal heart of the case. For example, we did not say “tax
credits” when asking about the core issues in Arizona Christian—out of
concern that this phrasing would prejudice the case. Instead, we chose
“discount on taxes” as our identifying nomenclature. Somewhat differently,
we chose the phrase “interrogate a child” rather than “interview a child” in
our question about Camreta, out of a sense that the former term better
captured the legal weight and implications of the questioning.
We also decided that in our polling on constitutional issues less is more.
We deliberately did not give some information to our respondents. We did
not say, for instance, that the state of California had already admitted the
seriousness of its prison overcrowding and its violation of Eighth
Amendment protections.10 After all, despite these concessions, California
was still seeking to avoid judicially-enforced prisoner releases, preferring to
set its own schedule. In other instances, we consciously mimicked the
language and argument presented in the briefs in an effort to highlight the
central, contested legal issues. Readers can decide whether we achieved
our goals of clarity for non-specialists while remaining faithful to the most
important constitutional matters at hand.
Those who do not poll regularly may want to note three further
safeguards we implemented to protect the integrity of our study.
First, the four cases were presented to each respondent in random order.
This technique ensures that there is no systematic influence of one question
on a succeeding question, nor a pattern of fatigue. It should be said that we
purposely order questions when appropriate, hypothesizing that one will
10. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1910 (2011) (discussing a lower court ruling in
which “the State conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care violated prisoners’ Eighth
Amendment rights and stipulated to a remedial injunction”).
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have an effect on another, and hoping to measure that effect, but the aim
here was to avoid order effects, not measure them.11
Second, it is a matter of course that within each question pollsters do not
offer the choice in the same order each time, but have the programmer
randomly rotate the answer categories. Making sure that all the listeners do
not hear the answers to the questions in exactly the same order minimizes
the effects of primacy and recency, the ideas that respondents may tend to
choose the first response they hear simply because it sunk in first, or that
they tend to choose the last answer they hear simply because it is the
freshest in their minds.
Finally, for three of the four cases we asked two distinct background
queries. The first question—“How much have you heard or read” about the
case?—was not meant to elicit information, though the answers were
recorded and reported. The question was meant to introduce a new subject,
and give a bit of basic information to the listener and also to keep him or
her engaged, rather than just passively listening to a single, lengthier
statement.
All this said, we plead guilty, but with extenuating circumstances, to the
charge that our study simplified intricate, layered legal cases that cannot be
readily boiled down to brief survey questions,. It is perfectly true that all
these cases have a complexity of issues and many subtleties which are lost
in reducing them to just a single sentence or group of phrases. A glaring
example is found in Arizona Christian. On its merits, the case initially
revolved around the question of whether the state of Arizona violated the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause by offering tax credits for
donations to groups which in turn gave money to private, religiously
affiliated schools (presumably a policy attracting parents sending their own
children to private, religiously affiliated schools). The Arizona program
was described by the New York Times’ Adam Liptak as “novel and
complicated.”12 To confuse matters further, by the time the case reached
the Court, the matter at issue had largely become a question of whether the
Ninth Circuit had properly overruled the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona, which had denied plaintiffs’ standing to sue under
exceptions regarding tax credits and establishment questions carved out in
Flast v. Cohen.13 Needless to say, the average voter would not be able to
sift through these technical criteria; even if we were to devote ten minutes
of explanation, never mind the roughly thirty seconds we used to solicit
their views on the case. But, notwithstanding this concession, we stand by
the value of our polling on Arizona Christian and the other cases. While
the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion reviewed Arizona’s distinctive private
11. For purposeful order effects, see Dan Cassino, Krista Jenkins & Peter J. Woolley,
Measuring “What If?” Standard Versus Priming Methods for Polling Counterfactuals,
SURVEY PRACTICE (Nov. 24, 2008, 3:53 PM), http://surveypractice.files.wordpress.com/
2008/11/survey-practice-november-20081.pdf.
12. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Tax Credit for Religious Tuition, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2011, at A16.
13. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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school support system on the narrow and arguably fraught grounds of Flast,
and in fact denied standing to the plaintiffs, the decision did not put a stop
to Arizona’s policy. Thus, the heart of the case is still very much about
whether the state could grant such tax credits, and that question is still very
much alive. States seeking to emulate, or avoid, Arizona’s school policies
may very well look at public opinion polling on the subject—which offers
some clear perspective—in addition to considering the Court’s complex, 54 decision.
A more esoteric objection to our polling initiative is to claim that most
survey results are simply an artifact of asking the question. In this view,
“public opinion” is itself an artificial construct—trees falling in a forest that
does not exist. While some people have pertinent, detailed information and
are actively engaged with at least some questions pollsters might ask, most
of the public do not usually have opinions on most questions of policy, not
to mention law. Thus, the concern is that respondents simply invent
answers when asked because they can and they know they are expected to
have answers.
To this objection we are strangely sympathetic, if only because so much
of the literature in psychology and economics supports the charge that
humans are rationalizers, acting on underlying impulses or prejudices
regardless of the amount of information they have acquired, and often
irrespective of objectively defined “good” outcomes.14
But this concern is so generalized it calls into question all polling and
indeed all of public opinion. We know very well from pre-election surveys
that polling does rise to impressive levels of accuracy and prediction. As
for public opinion, it may consist of little more than what Walter Lippman
wrote a century ago: people coming into a theatre in the third act, staying
just long enough to decide who is the hero and who is the villain, and
leaving long before the curtain comes down.15 But in a republic committed
to popular rule, and especially one in which the lines of accountability and
governing are so numerous and tangled,16 the public voice, however
difficult to capture, is still a vital source of information, and polling remains
one of the best (admittedly flawed) measures we have.
An objection less comprehensive than calling all survey results artifacts
of the investigation would simply charge that the public’s lack of
information about the Court, to say nothing of emerging constitutional law,
makes our investigation foolish.17 In addition to asking the public about tax
14. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 1–25 (2008).
15. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 117 (1925).
16. See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the
Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2003).
17. PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 9 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack
Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (“The public often does not have either the relevant
information concerning the court’s decision or the tools to understand it.”); Tom Goldstein &
Amy Howe, But How Will the People Know? Public Opinion as a Meager Influence in
Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, 109 MICH. L. REV. 963, 974
(2011) (“[T]he public is completely unaware of the overwhelming majority of the Supreme
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credits or prison overcrowding, why not ask about the merits and demerits
of stereotactic radiosurgery as a means of removing a meningioma?
The answer to this query, of course, is that we do not ordinarily think
complex surgical techniques are answerable to the views of the public in the
same way as constitutional interpretation and understanding. Different
currents of what has been sometimes called “popular constitutionalism”
insist that either as an empirical or normative matter (or both), the public
does or should have some sway in shaping our supreme law.18 Thus, at a
minimum, we are interested in soliciting the views of the voting public on
constitutional matters because they are expected to have opinions on this
subject. How these opinions, however ill-informed they may be, differ
among subgroups (including those demarcated by age, gender, race,
geography, and party identification), or differ from what the Court rules,
presents original and intrinsically interesting information to students of law
and politics.
Moreover, the public’s very level of ignorance about the Supreme Court,
its workings, and constitutional law is subject to some debate. James
Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, for example, have argued that many reports
of the public’s lack of knowledge about the Court are poorly framed and
unreliable.19 And while we have reasons to believe the public has limited
awareness or understanding of, say, Roe v. Wade20 as a particular decision
of the Supreme Court,21 this observation does not settle whether the public
has coherent views about abortion or the underlying contest of values and
even legal principles involved in Roe and other abortion cases. Indeed, we
note that political scientists are engaging in a broader debate about precisely
how we measure political literacy amongst the electorate, with some
arguing that the information required for effective and responsible
citizenship is qualitatively different from what is often tested in many
surveys that purport to find egregious voter ignorance.22
We also note that even if one were to accept, relatively uncritically, the
proposition that the public is generally uninformed and disengaged with
respect to constitutional matters, this claim would not necessarily be true
across all issue areas and at all times. Consequently, our polling research is
valuable as part of wider efforts to understand the circumstances under
which the public is more and less attentive and informed—and the
Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence.”); Gerald Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89
B.U. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2009) (citing scholarship that “uniformly finds most Americans
do not have a clue as to what the Court is doing or has done”).
18. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
19. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court? A
Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POLS. 429 (2009).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 566 (discussing the public’s lack of understanding
about Roe).
22. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, If Democracies Need Informed Voters, How Can They
Thrive While Expanding Enfranchisement?, 9 ELECTION L.J.: RULES, POLS., & POL’Y 111
(2010); Michael Schudson, America’s Ignorant Voters, 24 WILSON Q. 16, 22-23 (2000
Spring).
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consequences of higher levels of attention and constitutional fluency. In
addition, to the degree our polling may help in identifying areas of
persistent public ignorance, inconsistency, or confusion about the Supreme
Court and constitutional interpretation, our work can play a part in future
educational initiatives seeking to correct these deficiencies.
A more refined and particular objection to this project might contend that
our efforts are insufficiently fine-grained, that is, that our survey of the
public overlooks important subgroups likely to be especially influential
with the Court or on a particular topic.23 While, as noted, our polling did
break down responses by region, basic ethnic background, party, gender,
and age, we do not doubt there are other categories of likely interest and
importance. Concurring with other research, we find it plausible, for
example, that highly educated members of the public, along with lawyers,
single-issue voters, and members of organized interest groups, represent
subgroups within our polled respondents with distinctive relationships to
the Supreme Court and constitutional law. Of course, in our minds, these
observations suggest that the proper cure for these ills is more polling and
greater specification, not less.
Finally, and closely related to this last point, we note that a number of
scholars have postulated that distinct blocs of elites as opposed to the
general populace have a special relationship with the Court—and it is these
cadres that should be the pertinent objects of discussion and investigation
with respect to their views on the Court and constitutional law.24 For the
moment, we are agnostic on these questions, largely because they are
beyond our objectives and do not necessarily diminish the value of our
current work. Even if “elites,” however defined, influence the Court and
direction of constitutional law more than the people as a whole, this
observation hardly ends the case for studying the public’s opinions of
emerging cases. First, there is plenty of research to support the importance
of public opinion in shaping law. Second, it is likely that the public has a
substantial impact on elite political participants—providing at least an
indirect channel for influencing our constitutional law and the highest court
of the land.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE INITIATIVES
As with many voyages of discovery, our initial polls of pending
constitutional cases presented unanticipated problems, some intriguing
outcomes, and ultimately placed us in a vast and, we believe, intellectually
fertile landscape for the future. Notably, in presenting our findings to some
colleagues and members of the press we encountered some confusion about
the purposes and utility of our results. For all the growing recognition in
the academy of the myriad ways in which voters, elected officials, and
23. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT (2010) (discussing groups and
individuals influential with respect to the Court’s docket formation and decision making).
24. See Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites,
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010) (discussing public support for judicial
independence).
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private actors and groups shape and interpret constitutional law, we suspect
that for many, polling the public about their constitutional views is
perceived as eccentric, at best, and possibly antagonistic to judicial
independence and the rule of law.25
That said, we are encouraged by the process and results of our
solicitation of the public’s views on constitutional matters and cases.
Through both observation of the survey interview process and examination
of the results, we did not detect any obvious confusion, uncertainty, or
incoherence in how members of the public contemplated and responded to
our questions, at least not more than in other polling exercises. The
percentage of respondents whose responses to these polling questions were
“don’t know” or “unsure,” was similar to the percentage of “don’t knows”
for many standard, broader polling questions.
We also found the results more interesting than anticipated as we
discovered differences in opinion among subgroups that we had not
predicted. For example, the absence of partisan division in Camreta, the
case involving interrogation of a minor, may be a marker of the public’s
entrenched, widespread support for traditional civil liberties in the case of
minors, may reflect the low ebb of our current trust in government
institutions, or both.26 At the same time, we found cases, such as Plata,
where there was a seemingly intense and clear public position at odds with
the Court’s eventual ruling. This outcome invites examination of both
whether the public’s views remained stable after the decision as well as
whether (and what) political organizations and entrepreneurs picked up on
and exploited the public mood on this issue.
In sum, we are realistic about the constraints of our research, but
encouraged by the degree to which the results raise and sometimes teasingly
answer interesting questions about the public’s engagement of
constitutional issues and the Court’s relationship with popular opinion. In
order to refine, expand, and systematize our survey of cases, we are
currently recruiting a larger group of researchers including scholars of
public opinion and the Court, journalists, and legal practitioners, to help
identify new, pending cases to be heard during the 2011 term to poll. This
group will also assist us in question construction and in identifying
shortcomings of our polls or areas where we need additional information
such as in the solicitation of information about additional demographic or
political subgroups. We anticipate that we will identify at least six cases for
the upcoming term, commencing another national poll that will finish long

25. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURT SERVES
AMERICA 14 (2006) (citing widespread support for judicial independence as a critical feature
of our political and constitutional system). See also Baum and Devins, supra note 24, and
accompanying text; Bruce Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and The
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Legislative Attitudes, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127
(2004) (discussing the rise of deferential attitudes to the Court and judicial review amongst
members of Congress).
26. Press Release, Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958-2010 (April
18, 2010), http://people-press.org/2010/04/18/public-trust-in-government-1958-2010/.
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before the justices hand down their rulings. We will make our results,
methods, and interpretations available through the PublicMind website.
As the number of cases we poll grows, and as our understanding of our
results becomes more nuanced and robust, we will consider adding
additional measures to our work, including focus groups and experimental
research. Overall, we anticipate that our observations of patterns, both in
public opinion and in its contrasts to and echoes of Court decisions, will
become richer over time, and that we will be building up a novel and useful
body of original research, pushing outward the bounds of knowledge of the
Court, the public, and constitutional democracy.

